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Since World War II, industrial management has been undergoing a
transition from an art, based on experience, towards a profession,
based on a structure of principles and science. The cause of this
transition is the need for a systematic understanding of the forces
that comprise the dynamic character of industrial effort. One of the
techniques that is evolving in this transitory period is the learning
curve theory. This theory has the unique ability to predict, with a
high degree of accuracy, future declines in man-hour requirements
to accomplish work of a repetitive nature. The airframe industry has
accepted this technique as a principal component of its management
decision making process. As a tool to enhance effective manage-
ment, it is believed it has applicability to most Navy production and
overhaul programs. Its applicability to three aircraft overhaul pro-
grams is established by an analysis of empirical data gathered from
a major Naval air station. Aggressive management, in this age of
rapid change, cannot afford to overlook any advance that will clarify
and fortify decisions based on experience, intuition, and judgment.
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An executive of a washing machine firm chanced to cross
paths with an executive of a large aircraft firm. The conversation
turned to manufacturing costs and the appliance executive remark-
ed, "It has taken my company two years to determine the exact
cost of the current washing machine we are manufacturing."
The aircraft executive stated that many times his company is
forced to make cost determinations on similar items within a matter
of a few minutes. Then he said, "I'll bet you a steak dinner that
I can calculate the cost of your 100,000th washing machine within
10% accuracy by using a learning curve based on aircraft production. "
The appliance executive accepted the bet and in response to
questions he furnished the weight of the washing machine and the
cost of the first unit produced. During the next few minutes he
watched the aircraft executive work with pencil, ruler, and log-log
graph paper.
After he had completed plotting the curve, the aircraft execu-
tive stated, "Your 100,000th washing machine should cost you
$134.80."





LEARNING CURVES AND THEIR USES
The Preface of this study may have the sound of a fairy tale
but actually it contains more fact than fiction. The technique that
the aircraft executive was using is known by many names: learning
curve, improvement curve, progress curve, management improve-
ment curve, and efficiency curve. Regardless of the specific name
applied, the technique does have unique predictive abilities that
may preclude management decision based on the hunch or guessti-
mate.
A. LEARNING CURVE THEORY
There is no general body of literature that covers the applica-
tion of the learning curve theory to general manufacturing and rework
of a repetitive nature. Much has been written concerning its use in
the airframe industry. In fact, from the manufacturing standpoint,
it was the airframe industry that prior to World War II developed the
technique and used it for estimating the cost of producing airframes.
lHarold Asher , Cost -Quantity Relationships in the Airframe
Industry (U.S. Air Force Project Rand, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California, July 1956) R-291 p. 1.

Basically, the learning curve is simple to understand. Intui-
tively it has been accepted by mankind for centuries i.e.
, a worker
learns as he works . The more frequently a worker repeats an opera-
tion, the more efficient he becomes. The more efficient he becomes,
the less labor that is involved in the units produced. This idea is
not new but what is relatively new is that the efficiency or improve-
ment is regular enough to be predictable. This predictability is what
has revitalized an otherwise commonplace notion and affords industry
a new tool to be used in the solution of its many and complex prob-
lems .
As far as can be determined, this predictability was first dis-
2
covered in 1936 by T. P. Wright of the Curtis s -Wright Corporation.
From empirical studies he found that the relationship between average
direct man-hour cost and cumulative number of airframes produced
(cumulative output) could be expressed by the function
Y = ax ,
where Y is average direct man-hours, x is cumulative output, and a
and b are parameters . The value of a yields the direct man-hour cost
2 T. P. Wright, "Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes, "
Journal o f the Aeronautical Sciences




for unit number one and the value of b defines the "slope" of the pro-
gress curve. From his studies Wright found that b had a value of
-.322. In Wright's formula this value for b produces an "80 per cent"
curve. This means that each time the total quantity of units produced
is doubled, average man-hour cost declines to 80 per cent of the
average cost before the doubling of output. In general terms, the learn-
ing curve theory states that as the total quantity of units produced
doubles, the cost per unit declines by some constant percentage.
The learning curve is a product of all efforts to improve. In
addition to improvements in worker's methods, a learning curve is
affected by better planning on the part of the shop foreman, improve-
ments of tools, simplification of work flow, improved procurement
procedures, etc. The most significant of these is increased efficien-
cy on the part of the direct worker. Consequently, the higher the
percentage of worker effort versus machine effort, the greater should
be the rate of improvement. In the production of screws by automatic
screw machines, there is very little room for improvement in the pro-
cess. On the other hand, considerable improvement is experienced
when a person puts a jigsaw puzzle together for the second time. It
is the totality of manual and mental effort in this second operation
^Asher , loc. cit.

that makes the difference.
Another factor that affects a learning curve is previous exper-
ience or know-how. If a new design aircraft is to be made by two
manufacturers and one of them is new to the industry, it can be ex-
pected that this new entry will display a greater absolute reduction
in man-hour costs from unit one to two than will be true of the manu-
facturer with know-how. The latter company will bring its exper-
ience to bear on the first unit of production and consequently will
require fewer man-hours than the new company who will be gaining
experience on its first unit. This difference in starting points does
not in inself infer differing learning curves. However, since there
is more for the new company to "learn", due to its lack of know-how,
the experience gained by it on the first unit will be reflected by a
greater reduction in man-hour costs on unit two than that obtained by
the manufacturer with previous experience.
B. AIRFRAME INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE
By the end of World War II the U.S. Air Corps was convinced
that much could be gained by both the airframe industry and the
government if more detailed studies could be made of the learning
curve. To further this aim they published, in 1947, the now famous,
"Source Book of World War II Basic Date: Airframe Industry". 4 To
4Air Material Command, Dayton, Ohio, 1947
X
this date this book has been the chief source of data for most empi-
rical learning curve studies. Studies based on these data have been
made by all of the major airframe companies, educational institutions,
and research companies such as the Stanford Research Institute and
the Rand Corporation.
The results of these studies indicate that the learning curves
experienced by the industry for World War II fighter production, range
from a low of 65 per cent to a high of 95 per cent. Part of the reason-
ing for this variance is:
Proven or similar models produced in experienced
facilities
.
Proven models produced in new facilities
.
New models produced in new or experienced
facilities
In order to arrive at a comparative basis for different models , the
industry uses as its measurement, man-hour cost per pound of air-
frame weight.
As a result of these studies the theory has been refined and
expanded. Today it is used not only for predicting man-hour cost
Crawford-Strauss Study, Air Material Command, Dayton,
Ohio, 1947, p. 13.

(which is by far the biggest cost factor in airframe production)
, but
also for predicting material and overhead costs. Learning curves
are important tools to both the airframe industry and the Government
as is evidenced by the following that was reported by W. A. Raberg,
Jr. , of Northrop Aircraft:
(1) Military planners use the learning curve to
estimate the nation's aircraft mobilization
expansion potential. Air Force equipment,
pilots, ground crews and supporting personnel,
training schools, etc. , are all closely co-
ordinated with aircraft production, and there-
fore reflect the reliability of the learning curve
theory;
(2) The Government uses the learning curve to
measure aircraft manufacture for efficiency
and production dependability;
(3) The Government checks aircraft manufacturers'
bids for accuracy and reasonableness. This
examination is largely based upon statistical
analysis of the manufacturer's own record with
respect to general industry production perform-
ance;
(4) Aircraft manufacturers use the learning curve
in preparing bids for new business;
(5) Aircraft manufacturers use the learning curve
in developing labor loads , area and equipment
requirements, shop efficiency measures,
budgets, and often standards; and
(6) Aircraft manufacturers use the learning curve
to measure the progress of active contracts.
This is often the basis for contract payments
and loans .
6
^W. A. Raborg, Jr. , "Mechanics of the Learning Curve,"
Aero Digest, Vol. 65, No. 5, November, 1952, p. 18.

One of the extraordinary phenomenon concerning the "80 per
cent" curve of the airframe industry, that was developed by T. P.
Wright in 1936, is the fact that despite the radical changes and
technological advances that have taken place in the industry since
that time, the current average rate of improvement for all airframes
manufactured is still 20% or an 80% learning curve.
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
One of the many responsibilities of the Bureau of Naval
Weapons (BuWeps) , is the preparation of overhaul schedules for
Naval aircraft. As can well be imagined, with a multiplicity of over-
haul points , aircraft (including models and configurations)
,
and
world-wide locations of aircraft requiring overhaul, the determination
of optimal schedules is highly complex and almost impossible to
achieve.
It is a well known fact that the results attained from any well
structured schedule are only as good as the quality of the information
used to develop the results. In computer language, where a well
programmed computer represents a highly sophisticated model struc-
ture, the term used to connote this output quality is "GIGO" -
garbage in, garbage out! Therefore, having settled on an acceptable
7Bureau of Aeronautics Statistical Analysis Course. A course
prepared by Harbridge House, Inc. , Cambridge, Mass.

model for a schedule, the most important function is the assimila-
tion of reasonably correct and meaningful input information.
The information required to develop an overhaul schedule for
the maintenance of Naval aircraft is varied and voluminous. One of
the key components of this information is the average time to accom-
plish the overhaul of the various aircraft models and configurations.
This average time is not only important to over-all scheduling but










Inventory levels , etc.
Since World War II, learning curves have been widely used
by airframe manufacturers to estimate costs and to schedule produc-
tion. They are accepted by the Department of Defense as one of the
elements in pricing airframe procurement contracts. Due to the
success of learning curves in this sector of industry, it is believed

that the same technique may have application in overhaul or re-
work programs
.
Consequently, the primary purpose of this study is to deter-
mine whether or not there is applicability of the learning curve
theory to Navy aircraft overhaul programs. As a secondary purpose,
this study will investigate theoretical and empirically deduced im-
plications of the learning curve as a management decision making
device.
D. DEVELOPMENT OF A LEARNING CURVE
1. GENERAL. As stated earlier, a very little has been written
about the construction and application of learning curves. What
has been written has almost exclusively been in the area of air-
frame production. Some of these writers have been accused of
writing for their fellow specialists in a form that is unintelligible
to the average reader and on certain occasions these sophomoric
o
writers even have difficulty understanding each other. The pre-
sentation in this study will be in a comprehensible form with only
a minimum lacing of mathematical models and derivations .
Perhaps because of the lack of a general body of literature on
8
I. D. J. Bross, Design for Decision (New York, The Mac-
millan Company, 1953), pp. 2-3.

the subject, many people are misinformed as to the use of learning
curves. Some people look upon them as panaceas for cost estima-
tion, workload schedules, etc. On the other end of the continium,
they are regarded by skeptics as highly theoretical techniques re-
quiring detailed knowledge of higher mathematics and having little
or no practical value in arriving at management decisions
.
Neither of these extremes is correct. Learning curves, like
any other quantitative approach to decision making should never be
taken as absolute. Any statement made about a universe when only
sample data are at hand is only an inference or implication. How-
ever it is often the implications of certain facts rather than the facts
themselves that lead to action. So it is with learning curves, pre-
dictions are being made on the basis of sample data and as such
cannot be accepted as absolute. As a useful tool however, they are
better than "guesstimates" and in the airframe industry have proven
more valid than previously used techniques.
2. CONSTRUCTING THE CURVE ON ARITHMATIC SCALE PAPER. For
illustration purposes, hypothetical data will be used to construct
an 80% learning curve. The data in Table I indicates that as the
quantities of output are doubled the average man-hour cost declines
to 80% of the average cost before the doubling. By plotting these
data on arithmatic scale paper, using the horizontal or X axis to
10

represent the units of production and the vertical or Y axis to repre-
sent the average man-hour cost, and connecting the plotted points, a
graphic presentation of the curve is available. The resulting curve is
shown in Figure I. The dramatic reduction of man-hour costs for the
first eight units is quite obvious . The curve then begins to slope down-
ward more gradually as the percentage of improvement is spread over
a larger and larger number of units
.
The sharp reduction experienced in the first units reflects the
early correction of problems that were either not resolved or were over-
Q
looked in initial planning and tooling
.
TABLE I










gCareful planning and efficient tooling usually are reflected
in lower first unit costs and since there is less for the workers to
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The main disadvantage of plotting the curve on arithmatic
scale paper is that it is difficult at first glance to detect the linear-
ity of the percentage improvement (80% between doubled quantities) .
Additionally, when the number of units is large, the arithmatic scale
is inconvenient because of the space required to plot the data. To
overcome these and other reasons the learning curve is usually
plotted on log-log paper.
3. THE LEARNING CURVE ON LOG-LOG PAPER . Log-log paper is
simply a grid that uses a ratio scale on the horizontal and vertical
axis. The fundamental property of a ratio scale is that a given dis-
tance on a particular scale always represents the same ratio or the
same per cent difference--no matter where on the scale this distance
is taken. The distance from 1 to 2 equals that from 2 to 4, and that
from 4 to 8 , etc
.
When the same data from Table I are plotted on log -log paper,
as shown in Figure 2 , it is to be noted that the learning curve is
portrayed by a straight line. This is in keeping with the linearity of
the learning curve theory, that dictates a constant rate of change as
quantities are doubled, and the fact that on log-log paper the dis-
tance between doubled quantities is also equal.
To determine the slope of a plotted curve, it is first necessary
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vertical or Y axis coincides with the last reference number in the
cycle in which the data are contained. (This new plot may also be
considered as the first reference number of the next higher cycle.)
In the case of Figure 2 the unit number one data intercepts the Y axis
at the last reference number of the cycle, 100, therefore the slope of
the curve to unit number two and the point at which this bisects the
Y axis indicates the slope of the curve. Realizing that the data used
to construct the curve in Figure 2 was drawn from hypothetical data
representing an 80% curve (Table I) , it is not by coincidence that the
determination resulted in an 80% curve.
Figure 3 is a typical learning curve to illustrate how this method
is used when the value of unit number one intercepts the Y axis at
other than the end of a cycle. The easiest way of reproducing the
curve, so that the unit number one intercept on the Y axis coincides
with the last reference number in the cycle, is through the use of a
set of parallel rulers. Lacking these, it is necessary to measure the
distance from where the plotted curve intercepts the Y axis-unit num-
ber one- to the end of the cycle. In Figure 3 this distance is 5/8".
Then, at any second point on the plotted curve, the same distance is
°On the log-log paper, one cycle spans a 10 to 1 ratio; that
is, the number at the top of a cycle is 10 times the number at the
bottom of the cycle. The number of cycles to be used on the vertical
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measured off vertically. In Figure 3 this was arbitrarily done at unit
number four. This second point is then connected to the point of the
end of the cycle by a straight line. Of course, this line will be
parallel with the plotted curve. The point at which this line bisects
the Y axis for unit number two indicates the slope of the curve. In
this case the curve is approximately 85%.
Another method of accomplishing the same thing is to select
any point on the learning curve. Select another point at twice the
production of the first unit. Divide the labor hours of the second
unit by the labor hours of the first unit. Assuming the first point
picked is 10 units then the second point would be 20 units. Then,
labor hours of the 20th unit divided by the labor hours of the 10th
unit equals the learning curve percentage.
A logarithmic solution is explained in the next section.
4. SMOOTHING OUT A LEARNING CURVE. In constructing a cumu-
lative average man-hour learning curve, it is first necessary to
accumulate the cumulative average man-hour data and then plot the
data on log-log paper. It would be sheer coincidence if this plotting
resulted in a recognizable straight line. In almost every case a
straight line will have to be fitted. This fit can be done by inspec-
tion if the plotted points are reasonably close to a hand fitted line.
If the points are not reasonably close to the fitted line, then the
17

determination of the best fitted line will have to be achieved mathe-
matically.
There are many methods for accomplishing this fit mathematic-
ally. One method, developed by the Boeing Airplane Company, is
11
especially designed for a log-log relationship. This method is
rather lengthy and complex and will not be covered here. Probably
the best known method for fitting a line to data that evidences linear-
ity is the method of least-squares. This technique was introduced by
12
the French mathematician, Adrien Legendre, more than 150 years ago.
There are three formulae to be used with this method. One is the
log of both sides of the formula developed by T. P. Wright to define
the slope of the function:
1
3
(1) Log y = log a + b log x.
There are two others as follow:
( 2) b = oXiQg.x logj/_ -_^log_ x£-_log_y
y\ Sdogx) 2 - (Slogx) 2
,oAl Slog y - b2[ log x(3) log a =
n
The "n" refers to the number of observations or cumulative averages
11
"The Improvement Curve Trainees Manual" )Wichita: The
Boeing Airplane Company, 1958), pp. 42-43. (Mimeographed.)
X
^A detailed explanation of the method of least-squares can
be found in almost every standard textbook on statistics.
13
For a definition of terms, see page 2.
18

contained in the data to be smoothed. The b and log a in equations
(2) and (3) are the constants in equation (1) . The value of b defines
the slope of the curve and the value of log a identifies the man-hours
that apply to unit number one of the fitted line.
Table II gives sample cumulative average man-hour data for the
first ten units of a hypothetical production run. The Table also con-
tains the various preliminary calculations necessary to solve the
least-square formulae. In actual practice raw data would be com-
piled from production or cost accounting records and serve as the
basis for these calculations.
TABLE II
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE MAN-HOURS (y) FOR UNITS
1 THROUGH 10 LEAST-SQUARES WORK SHEET
Unit
2
X y Log x (Log x) Log y Log x Log y
1 8700 .0000 .0000 3.9395 .0000
2 6200 .3010 .0960 3.7924 1.1415
3 5400 .4771 .2275 3.7324 1.7807
4 5100 .6021 .3614 3.7076 2.2323
5 5000 .6990 .4886 3.6990 2.5856
6 4800 .7782 .6053 3.6812 2.8647
7 4500 .8451 .7141 3.6532 3.1873
8 4200 .9031 .8155 3.6232 3.2 721
9 4000 .9542 .9102 3.6021 3.4371
10 3800 1.0000 1.0000 3.5798 3.5798
6.5598 5.2186 37.0104 24.0811
Having completed the work sheet it is next necessary to solve
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b = - .2152
Using this derived value for b, it is now possible to solve
equation (3) for log a.
37.0104 - (-.2152) (6.5598)loga= __
= _3_7_.P_l_04_t_l_-_4_Li7__
10
log a = 3.8422, antilog 3.8422 = 6953.
Substituting the determined values of b and log a in formula (1),
it is possible to solve for the value of y for any given x. Knowing
that the antilog of log a (6953) is the first point on the fitted line, it
is only necessary to determine one other point in order to plot the line
Solving formula (1) for y when x equals 6 yields a value of y of 4621.
Connecting these two points by a straight line achieves the least-
squares fit. Figure 4 illustrates the plotted data from Table II and the
fitted curve
.
Formula (1) may also be used to determine the per cent of the

























in terms of the percentage ratio of unit 1 cumulative average man-
hours to unit 2 cumulative average man-hours . In other words , the
answer for y will yield the slope or the per cent learning curve.
Log y = log 100 + (-.2152) log 2
= 2 + (-.2152) .3010
= 2 - .0648
= 1.9352
y = antilog 1.9352 = 86% learning curve.
E . APPROACH OF THIS STUDY
When new aircraft are to be inducted into the Navy's overhaul
or rework program, BuWeps promulgates the requirements or specifi-
cations that constitute an overhaul. These specifications stipulate
the various tasks that are to be performed on each and every aircraft,
of the specified model and configuration, that is subject to over-
haul. In order to determine schedules, manning levels, etc., an
estimate of the number of direct labor hours necessary to accomplish
an overhaul must be made. Based on the job content of the specifica-
tions, this estimate is arrived at through the use of Engineered Per-
formance Standards (EPS) and similar scientific time and motion
methods . This estimate or standard is called a Weight Factor and is
expressed in thousands of hours . A Weight Factor of 8 . 3 assigned to
22

an overhaul would indicate that the estimated number of direct labor
hours to complete the overhaul is 8,300.
Assuming that the Weight Factor was reasonably estimated and
that the job content of the overhaul remains unchanged, the Weight
Factor stands for the life of the overhaul. If the learning curve phe-
nomena is at work in the Navy's overhaul program, then the many
management decisions that are based on Weight Factors are incorrect
to the extent of the existence of this influence. It is the search for
the answer to this question of applicability of the learning curve
theory that this study is primarily directed.
One of the most important considerations in a study of this
nature, is to insure that the data to be analyzed are comparable. If
the individual aircraft of a given model and configuration that undergo
overhaul are identical in all respects and are subject to the same work
during overhaul, then the question of comparability of unit direct la-
bor hours is solved. In the Navy's overhaul program this is not the
case. Individual aircraft differ as to installed equipments, and field
changes. Additionally, as an established overhaul of a given model
and configuration progresses, decisions are made to change the spec-
ifications and consequently the job content of an overhaul. These
decisions result in the assignment of a different Weight Factor for the
remainder of the overhaul run.
23

In the conduct of this study, these complications were recog-
nized and the source data were adjusted in order to achieve compar-
ability, the method used to refine the data is explained in Chapter
III.
The data used in this study were gathered from the Bureau of
Naval Weapons , Washington, D. C. , and the Overhaul and Repair
Department of the U.S. Naval Air Station, Alameda, California.
Data were collected for only three aircraft types due to the magnitude
of the manipulations necessary to refine and interpret the data. How-
ever, the object of the study is to determine the applicability of the
learning curve to the Navy's aircraft overhaul program, not to deter-
mine learning curves for all types of aircraft overhauled. For this
purpose, the data used seem adequate.
F. BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM THE STUDY
In the area of the Navy's overhaul program, it is hoped that
this study is but the beginning of a number of studies to validate and
refine the applicability of the learning curve. Assuming that this
study is successful in proving the relationship of the learning curve
theory, there are certain measures that must be taken before the
benefits to be derived from the application of the theory can be
achieved.






system in order to obtain meaningful and comparable cost classifi-
cations. The current system, that fortunately collects costs by in-
dividual aircraft, lumps dissimilar costs into the same account. The
extraction of these dissimilar costs into their appropriate components
in this study has been ponderous and at times, the method necessar-
ily arbitrary.
Having accomplished this phase, it would next be necessary
to conduct detailed studies to ascertain the learning curves that per-
tain to the various types of aircraft s , i.e. , fighters, bombers, trans-
ports, helicopters, etc. These curves would then serve as one of the
bases for management decisions in the overhaul program.
Additional studies should be directed at the development of an
overall learning curve for aircraft overhauls. Different sizes and
composition of basically similar items can be compared for learning
curve purposes by using the relative weights of the units as a basis
of comparison. In the airframe industry, the universally accepted
measurement is man-hours per pound of airframe weight.
The results of this work would not only be beneficial at the
Bureau of Naval Weapons level but would also serve the interests of
the local overhaul activities. At the Bureau level, more valid and
meaningful input data would be available for the formulation of opti-
mal overhaul schedules. These refined schedules then permit effect-
25

ive and efficient resource allocations. At the activity level, the
curves would be used to form sound management decisions on (1)
equipment requirements, (2) manning levels, (3) inventory levels,
(4) budgeting, (5) and induction of work units.
Another interesting benefit that it is believed will be achieved,
is psychological. The practice in many airframe plants is to allocate
to the foremen of the various shops a given number of man-hours for
each lot of airframes. These hours are usually obtained by a linear
extrapolation of the learning curve. With the knowledge, on the part
of the foremen and workers, of what is expected, it is not unusual
that the actual man-hour cost per lot follows the curve from which the
allotment of hours was estimated. This brings to mind the defini-
tion of a "happy" sailor; a sailor who knows what is expected of him.
From a psychological standpoint people are more likely to respond
when they know what they are supposed to do and particularly when
this offers a challenge. Both of these points are extant in the appli-
cation of the learning curve.
As Overhaul & Repair Departments are converted to commercial-
type accounting under Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) procedures , learn-
ing curves will be particularly valuable in estimating costs for sought




after overhaul contracts. Actually, learning curves have more im-
mediate relevance in a profit and loss type operation similar to that
envisioned in NIF operations; in order to be competitive, an activity
must be able to realistically forecast its costs.
Finally, it is hoped, that the success acquired in the aircraft
overhaul program through the use of learning curves , will inspire
other Bureaus of the Navy Department, that conduct construction or
overhaul programs, to investigate the susceptibility of their programs
to the use of learning curves.
G. CAUTIONS AS TO THE USE OF FINDINGS
The findings of this study can not be construed as an absolute
identification of learning curves. The findings do indicate the exist-
ence of the learning curve theory in the Navy's aircraft overhaul pro-
gram. This study was designed as an exploratory probe into the area
in the interest of stimulating a response on the part of management.
It is hoped that this response takes the form of studies that will in
fact be able to statistically identify the various curves that the find-
ings of this study indicate exist. There is a wealth of data available
in the filing cabinets of all Overhaul & Repair Departments. A feel-
ing of sincere satisfaction and accomplishment will be had by the
managers who analyze these data, identify the learning curves at





There are certain cautions that must be heeded in using the
data accumulated by cost accounting systems. Axiomatic with the
learning curve theory is the fact that total unit costs should also
evidence a negative slope. A curve may portray improvement but a
look at labor or material dollar costs may show an increase. If
labor dollar costs are up, an investigation may disclose that more
skilled and consequently more expensive workers are being hired.
This increased skill will undoubtedly reduce direct labor hours , but
at the expense of increased direct labor dollar costs. Concerning
increased material costs , if workers are not refurbishing ancillary
components but rather drawing new units from stock, direct labor
hours can be expected to be reduced but at the expense of increased
material costs. Trade offs of this nature must be viewed in the light
of their combined contribution to efficient operations.
Realizing the manipulation that cost data get before they are
presented to management in a finished report, it is only natural to
spot check the validity of data to be used. At different periods in
the learning curve, time studies should be conducted of actual over-
haul performance and the results verified with the data generated by
the accounting system.
What is said about the difficulty of comparing apples and or-

anges pertains to the comparison of units in the learning curve
theory. If the job content of each unit is not the same then a true
basis for comparison does not exist. As with all things in this uni-
verse, 100% reliability is almost impossible to achieve. Therefore,
a certain tolerance of differing job content is acceptable. This tol-
erance will be greater in an overhaul program than a manufacturing
one due to the nature of the work however, tolerances that material-





REVIEW OF SELECTED STUDIES
A. NAVY STUDIES
Of the various studies conducted in the area of learning
curves , the one most pertinent to this study is a study conducted
in 1957-58 by Kenneth W. Webb. At the time he was a researcher
working for the Bureau of Naval Weapons. The purpose of his study
was to explore the existence of learning curves in airframe and en-
gine overhauls
.
Webb's conclusions are ambiguous and it is believed have
clouded the issue of learning curves at work, in Navy overhaul pro-
grams. In his conclusions he states that the overhaul process has
a phenomenon at work that obscures the learning curve. This obscur-
ing process he, ". . .found to be the opposite to learning curves and
because of this it was called 'anti-learning curves'." The justifica-
tion of the reason for the existence of an anti-learning curve is not
'•Kenneth W. Webb, "Learning Curves in the Rework of




explained other than by the statement that it is, "... possibly due to
2technological complications and increasing age of the aircraft."
This is slim justification for such a novel and shattering hypothesis.
Other than identifying the existence of the so-called anti-
learning curve from empirical data, Webb does not develop the rea-
soning for his hypothesis nor does he evolve a method for predicting
the applicability of an anti-learning curve to future overhauls
.
For one to doubt the existence of an anti-learning curve is to
infer that Webb's basic data is suspect, that his data lack compar-
ability. It is believed that Webb's data was not homogeneous and
therefore his anti-learning curve theory lacks support.
The data used by Webb in his study was extracted from the
Section C's of the quarterly report "Industrial Cost and Performance
Report" (hereinafter referred to as, "Cost Report") submitted to BuWeps
by each Naval and Marine Corps Air Station having an Overhaul and
Repair Department. The data contained in these reports are not a
valid source for learning curve studies because (1) the data lacks
chronology, and (2) the job content of completed units varies.
It is most important in learning curve studies that the data be
analyzed in a chronological sequence. Without this, one of the funda-






the constant reduction applies to the succeeding doubled quantity.
The Cost Reports are prepared and submitted in accordance with re-
3
quirements of a Bureau of Naval Weapons handbook. As directed
by the handbook, Section C consists of, "Standard direct hours per
unit and total man-hours and charges reported on a closed job order
basis by unit completions by model and configuration on aircraft and
engine programs . " (Underscoring supplied.)
It is this reporting on a closed job order basis that destroys
the chronology of the reported units . Physically completed units are
not reflected on this report until all accounting charges have been
lodged and the account or job order officially closed. Normally it
would be considered that the accounting lag would apply to all units
equally and thus the completed units would be reported in sequence.
This however is not the case. Many units, in addition to overhaul,
will require concurrent repair. The execution of the repair requires
the purchase of certain materials and it is the delay incident to the
charging of job orders for these purchases that disrupts the sequence
of reporting
.
There is another procedure that is common in Overhaul and
3
Aeronautics Overhaul and Repair Cost Accounting Handbook
(Washington: Bureau of Naval Weapons




Repair Departments that causes a disruption in the sequence of re-
ported completions. This procedure is known as "back -robbing"
.
Simply explained, "back-robbing" means that when outstanding pur-
chased material will delay the completion of a unit, similar material
is "robbed" from a unit further down the schedule and the original
unit thus completed. This "back-robbing" is kept up until the pur-
chased material is received at which time it is used to complete the
last unit "robbed". The problem that this creates in connection with
the Cost Report is that the original unit may have been physically
completed in month one but the outstanding purchase may not have
been charged to the unit's job order until some four or five months
later. As far as the Cost Report is concerned that unit would not
show up as completed until the fourth or fifth month.
Another factor that is very important in learning curve studies
is the comparability of the source data. There are two causes that
affect the comparability of the data reported in Cost Reports (1) a
modification of the overhaul specifications and (2) the service
changes to be incorporated in an aircraft during overhaul.
The first of these is recognized in the report since completed
units of a given model are reported on the basis of a weight factor.
The weight factor determines the number of direct labor hours allowed
for a given set of overhaul specifications. Consequently, a modifi-
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cation of specifications for the overhaul of a given aircraft model
would show up as a separate entry because it would have a different
weight factor.
The problem of the service changes is_not recognized by the
Cost Report. Due to the rapid technology that is characteristic of
aircraft, the Navy from time to time promulgates aircraft service
changes that can be accomplished at the squadron level in order to
improve the safety or performance of an aircraft model. Depending
on the press of operational commitments, these changes may or may
not be made prior to an aircraft's overhaul. For this reason, the
individual aircraft of a particular model vary as to installed equip-
ments and other modifications. One of the objectives of an overhaul
is to correct this individuality by incorporating in deficient aircraft
the necessary aircraft service changes. As a result of this feature
of overhauls, the job content of an overhaul will vary from plane to
plane. Of 120 A4D-2's overhauled at NAS Alameda less than 15%
were comparable as to service change labor hours. As a percentage
of the total overhaul hours , the direct labor hours attributed to ser-
vice changes ranged from a low of 3% to a high of 41% with an aver-
age of 20%.
From the foregoing it is easy to see the distortions that are
created by the lack, of chronology and comparability of source data.
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It is reasonable to assume therefore that Webb's anti-learning curve
is the product of heterogeneous source data and not the product of an
extant force that must be considered in applying learning curves to
Navy overhaul programs
.
B. RAND CORP. STUDIES
The RAND Corp. , an independent non-profit organization de-
voted to scientific research in the interest of the national security and
welfare of the U.S., has conducted a number of studies of learning
curves in the airframe industry. These studies are valuable from the
4
standpoint of the coverage they afford the learning curve theory.
Unfortunately none of these studies treat the application of the theory
to rework programs but rather its application and use in the manufactur-
ing of airframes. Many of the findings however do have applicability
to rework programs and as such these studies are a source of refine-
ments and sophistications that future researchers should not overlook.
C. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE STUDY
One of the well known studies of the learning curve in the air-
frame industry is the study conducted by the Stanford Research Insti-
tute under contract with the U.S. Air Force. One of the conclusions
4See Bibliography under RAND Corp. for listing of these studies.
^Relationships for Determining the Optimum Expansibility of the
Elements of a Peacetime Aircraft Procurement Program, Stanford Research
Institute, prepared for Air Material Command, USAF , 1949.
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of the report is the introduction of the "B" factor. The study contains




is a better expression of the relationship between man-hour cost and
cumulative output, than the conventional equation developed by T. P.
Wright
.
The B in this formula is now commonly referred to as the "B"
factor. One of the basic assumptions in this formula is that the rate
of change or improvement is constant for a company with no previous
experience in airframe manufacturing and further this rate of improve-
ment is 29.3% or a learning curve of 70.7%. Therefore, in order to
compensate for companies that have previous familiarity a "B" factor
is assigned. If B equals O for a new company to the industry, then
the above equation can be written,
-.5
y = ax
which is the same as Wright's equation except that his b is replaced
by the value - . 5 .
The Stanford formula was the result of an investigation of
twenty-nine World War II models and has not been critically tested on
postwar data. Harold Asher in his study argues that the 70.7% curve
is not appropriate for postwar models and therefore the use of the
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Stanford formula would require the introduction of an additional para-
meter n and the formula would then take the form,




There is no question concerning the dependent relationship between
the "B" factor and the exponent n. However Asher questions the wis-
dom of trying to quantify two parameters when one would suffice. His
reasoning appears sound since today the conventional form expressed
by Wright is the one most widely used.
Using the Stanford formula the learning curve on log -log paper
shows a concavity at the beginning of the curve when the "B" factor
is greater than O . The rationale is that an experienced company will
encounter various rates of improvement during the early stages of a
production run. One writer identified such concavity as the result of
hiring inexperienced crews at different points in time during the first
7group of airframes.
It is reasonable to accept Asher's argument and consequently
the Stanford formula will not be used in the analysis of Navy overhaul
data in this study.
Asher, op_. cit., pp. 108-109.
7G. W. Carr, "Peacetime Cost Estimating Requires New





DATA AND METHODS USED
A. BUWEPS PERFORMANCE SUMMARY REPORTS
Initially it was intended to analyze data for 10 different plane
types at two different overhaul and repair activities within each of
the rework programs. These rework programs are classified as:
overhaul, overhaul/conversion, progressive aircraft rework (PAR),
PAR/conversion, and modified PAR. Each quarter BuWeps prepares
a "Performance Summary Report for Overhaul and Repair Departments".
In addition to other information this report contains a summary of com-
pleted aircraft by rework category. Within each category, this sum-
mary is broken by plane type and then activity. Opposite each activi-
ty are entries of the number of particular aircraft produced, the BuWeps
weight factor assigned, the job order completions, and the average
man-hours spent per aircraft.
Believing that these reports might serve as a source of informa-
tion for the study, BuWeps was requested and kindly furnished reports
for the latest eight quarters. In order to properly test the learning
curve theory, it was necessary to select only those aircraft for which
38

data were available from unit number one on. On this basis most of
the plane types contained in the reports could not be used since data
on the initial units overhauled were not available. Consequently
three plane types were selected: the P2V-7S that commenced PAR in
January 1961, the A4D-2 that commenced PAR in January I960, and
the A4D-2N that commenced PAR in January 1961 . Each plane type
was undergoing PAR at two activities; all three were being handled
by NAS Alameda, the A4D-2 and the 2N were in the lines at NAS
Quonset Point and the P2V-7S was also being handled by NAS Norfolk.
The initial plots by plane type and activity of the data from the
Performance Summary Reports was discouraging. There were very few
distinguishable trends and where they did show up, in most cases
they were positively sloped instead of negatively. At this point it
looked like K. W. Webb's "anti-learning curve" was a factual pheno-
menon. Without a justification for the existence of the phenomenon
it was believed that the best course of action was to check the valid-
ity of the source data.
A trip to the Overhaul and Repair Department of the NAS Alameda
verified the suspicion that the data was invalid for learning curve pur-
poses. It was brought out that the average man-hours reported in the
reports was on the basis of completed job orders and they they con-
tained man-hours required to incorporate deficient aircraft service
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changes. From the standpoint of the learning curve this contami-
nated the data in terms of chronology and comparability.
In view of this unforeseen problem it was decided that the
coverage of the study would have to be reduced. In lieu of the ten
different plane types at two different activities for each of the rework
programs, it was decided to restrict the study to the three plane types
mentioned earlier and only for the data available at NAS Alameda.
B. DATA ACCUMULATED FROM NAS ALAMEDA
Management control of the Navy's aircraft overhaul programs
is in part exercised through the analysis of two basic reports, the
Industrial Cost and Performance Report (identified earlier) and the
Industrial Production and Performance Report (hereafter referred to as
,
"Production Report") . Reports are submitted to BuWeps by each
Naval and Marine Corps Air Station having an Overhaul and Repair
Department. Certain sections of these reports are submitted each
month and other sections are submitted on a quarterly basis.
The sections that are of interest here are the sections that re-
port completions by individual aircraft type. The Cost Report had to
be discarded as a source of data because, as previously indicated,
completions are reported on the basis of closed job orders and not
See Chap. II, Section A, for an explanation of the problems
of chronology and comparability.
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physical completions. The Production Report was accepted as a
starting point since it reported individual units at the time of physi-
cal completion. Additionally, it reported the start and complete date
for each unit and thus it was possible to make adjustments for in-
dividual planes whose completion date was delayed due to lack of
material, etc.
Two problems associated with these data were (1) within each
plane type different weight factors were assigned as a result of
changes in the overhaul specifications, and (2) the data contained
no indication of the man-hours attributed to aircraft service change
work. For the purpose of determining the applicability of the learn-
ing curve, the data required smoothing so that aircraft to be compared
were in fact comparable as to job content.
C. METHOD OF SMOOTHING DATA
The smoothing operation for each plane type was conducted in
two parts (1) the extraction of the man-hours required to accomplish
the aircraft service change work, and (2) the reduction of the data to
a common weight factor. Due to the method of cost accumulation in
use, it was not possible to obtain exact data to accomplish the
smoothing.
Usually the change in specifications of the overhaul added or
eliminated elements of the overhaul. In no case did a change modify
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all elements of an overhaul. Consequently the learning by workers
was carried over from one change to the next as long as a change
did not increase the weight factor appreciably. For instance, if a
plane had a weight factor of 2 .2 and a change increased this to 6.1,
then there would be very little learning carried over to the new
change.
The first problem to be resolved was to determine the service
change man-hours applicable to each individual plane. Separate job
orders had not been set up to isolate this information. The next best
thing was to secure for each plane the service changes that were
accomplished and then to sum the Engineered Performance Standard
(EPS) man-hours assigned to each change. By subtracting this value
from the total man-hours charged to the plane it was felt that a com-
parable base could be achieved for all planes of a given weight fact-
or. It was recognized that the EPS man-hours were only estimates
but it was believed that the error in these estimates was not signifi-
cantly different than the error contained in the weight factor estimates
Having extracted these man-hours it was still necessary to
solve the problem of different weight factors for a given plane. This
problem only pertained to the A4D-2 and the 2N as the P2V-7S only
had one weight factor assigned. In the A4D-2 the problem was a
decrease in weight factors and in the A4D-2N an increase. If the
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estimating error between the weight factor and the actual man-hours
prior to a change, was the same as after the change, then this rela-
tionship could serve as a basis for normalizing the data. In the case
of the A4D-2 the error before change was 41% and after change was
39.4%. For the A4D-2N the error before change was 25.2% and after
change was 26.6%. Since these differences are insignificant they
were disregarded.
An example may clarify how this procedure works. Assume a
weight factor of 8 . is assigned to an overhaul. On the average, the
actual man-hours used is 6000. The estimating error here is 25%.
Next the specifications of the overhaul are changed and the new
weight factor assigned is 6.0. If the estimating error for this weight
factor is the same as the 8.0, then the actual man-hours used will
be 4500. To normalize these data on the basis of the 6.0 weight
factor it is necessary to reduce the 6000 man-hours associated with
the 8.0 weight factor by 25%. Doing this, the normalized man-hours
are reduced from 6000 to 4500. In this case it would indicate that
there was no learning since it took an equal number of man-hours,
4500, to do the same work at two different time periods.
The initial weight factor assigned to the A4D-2N was 1 .8 re-
presenting 1800 man-hours estimated by BuWeps to complete the
overhaul. A subsequent change in the specifications of the overhaul
43

changed this weight factor to 2 . 5 . In order to normalize the data
on the basis of 1.8, the actual man-hours of the units assigned a
weight factor of 2.5 were reduced by 26%. A 40% adjustment was
used to normalize the data of the A4D-2 .
At this point the raw data had been smoothed and were ready
for plotting. The plotting disclosed additional problems that are
covered in the following sections.
D. PLOTTING OF DATA
An initial analysis of the smoothed data revealed considerable
fluctuation among the first units of the P2V-7S. Further, this be-
ginning variation had a significant distorting effect on the cumula-
tive average man-hour calculations . The magnitude of this fluctua-
tion can be more fully appreciated if the data are plotted in arithmatic
graph paper. Figure 5 shows the plotting of the individual units. As
can be seen there is considerable fluctuation in the data but particu-
larly among the first twelve units. Superimposed on this plotting is
a regression line to indicate the trend of the data. This line was
fitted by the method of least-squares. As indicated by the line,
there is a declining trend in the man-hours however, the amount of
decline is not too significant in view of the number of units involved
and the scale used on the Y axis. Over the twenty-eight units
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reduction. In their relationship to this line, the first units appear
to be decidedly understated.
The distortion that the fluctuations of the initial units had on
the cumulative average man-hours is shown in Figure 6. At about
unit 10 this distortion is overcome and the plotting takes on a more
normal pattern indicating a reduction in man-hours . The reason for
the fluctuation in the first units of the P2V-7S could not be deter-
mined but there are a number of possible explanations. The one that
is accepted as the most likely is faulty cost recording at the outset
of the overhaul run. It is not unusual for workers who are assigned
to new work to initially record charges against former work because
the job order numbers of the former work are fresh in their memory.
After a short period of time on the new work, these old numbers are
forgotten and this source of erroneous cost recording eliminated.
The data plotted for the three plane types were from the be-
ginning of the particular overhaul through physical completions in
December 1961. The overhaul of the A4D-2 commenced in January
1960 and the overhauls of the A4D-2N and the P2V-7S in January 1961
The overhaul completions of the A4D-2 prior to 1 July 1960 presented
a little problem since prior to 1 July 1960 overhaul costs were accu-
mulated on a lot versus an individual unit basis. The size of the
lots varied from two to six aircraft. In order to make an adequate
46
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analysis of the applicability of the learning curve, the data for
these first units would have to be included. The question was how
to arrive at meaningful and comparative data that was indicative of
the actual costs incurred.
By extracting information from various completed records , the
following data was compiled for almost every lot:
Number of aircraft in the lot,
Average man-hours per lot
,
Average man-hours per lot attributed to aircraft
service change work,
BuWeps weight factor assigned to each lot, and
Physical completion date for each lot.
This information was sufficient to arrive at a smoothed average
man-hour cost per lot in chronological sequence.
The number of aircraft, by plane type, that were overhauled









A. PRESENTATION OF DATA
As stated earlier, the raw data by individual units, and by
lots in the beginning of the A4D-2 overhaul, were smoothed by
eliminating aircraft service change work, and by adjusting for
variances in weight factors . The purpose of this smoothing was
to achieve comparability of data. Appendix A is a tabular presen-
tation of the data for the A4D-2N. Shown are the raw data, the
adjustments for service changes and weight factors, the adjusted
man-hours, and the cumulative average man-hours.
The data for the A4D-2N was normalized on the basis of a
weight factor of 1.8. Thus the column titled, "Weight Factor Ad-
justment" reflects values only when the weight factor of a unit is
other than 1.8. Appendix A is representative of what was done for
each plane type consequently detailed tables are not included for the
The method of normalizing weight factors is explained in
Chapter III, Section C.
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A4D-2 and the P2V-7S. There were no weight factor adjustments
necessary for the P2V-7S since only one weight factor, 8.3, was as-
signed.
For plotting purposes, the "Cumulative Average Man-hours"
column of Appendix A was used for the A4D-2N. Tables 3 and 4 con-
tain the data that were used for the A4D-2 and the P2V-7S. It is to
be noted in Table 3 that there are no data for the plotting of man-hours
for units 1-29. The reason for this is that there were certain questions
concerning the applicability of cost data to specific units for the first
thirty aircraft in the overhaul. Rather than arbitrarily assigning costs
to specific units and possibly distorting the data, it was decided to
lump all pertinent costs together for the first thirty aircraft and calcu-
late an average man-hour cost for these units. Additionally, due to
the large number of units involved in this plane type, and the diffi-
culty in plotting the individual units after thirty, plotting was re-
stricted to ten unit increments.
B. DETERMINING LINES OF REGRESSION
The exciting part of any study is that portion that evaluates the
hypothesis of the study. All the work that precedes this portion is
like a prologue. After plotting the smoothed data for each plane type
on log-log paper, a discernible negative slope was evident in two out




SMOOTHED DATA USED FOR PLOTTING LEARNING CURVE OF A4D-2
CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE
rNiT AVE. MAN--HOURS UNIT AVE. MAN-HOURS
30 1755 120 1597
40 1720 130 1576
50 1653 140 1556
60 1672 150 1556
70 1620 160 1553
80 1594 170 1541
90 1591 180 1534
100 1596 190 1528
110 1599 200 1524
TABLE IV
SMOOTHED DATA USED FOR PLOTTING LEARNING CURVE OF P2V-7S
CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE































by visual inspection based on the scatter arrangement of the individ-
ual points, the lines of regression were determined by the method of
least-squares
.
The results of the plottings and the lines of regression, by plane
type, are reproduced in Figures 7,8, and 9. Figure 7 shows no
points for units 1-29. This, as stated earlier, is due to the question-
able nature of the costs identified to specific units for the first thirty
aircraft. The regression line however, gives theoretical values for
these units based on the actual cumulative average man-hours for
units 30 through 200. These values indicate that the first unit should
have taken approximately 2630 man-hours and the second unit approxi-
mately 2420 man-hours. Dividing 2630 into 2420 yields a learning
curve of 90% for the A4D-2 .
The regression line for the A4D-2N as shown in Figure 8, iden-
tifies the first unit as costing approximately 1800 man-hours and the
second unit approximately 1660 man-hours. Dividing the former into
the latter yields a learning curve for the A4D-2N of 92%.
Using all points plotted for the P2V-7S, Figure 9, the regres-
sion line would be positively sloped and by the method of least-
squares would have a value of 101.4%. This would mean that as
quantitites overhauled are doubled the man-hours required to accom-
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equal, an increase of this nature would indicate an inefficient man-
agement and work force. Before attributing such a charge to an or-
ganization the data would have to unequivocally evidence an upward
trend. An analysis of Figure 9 reveals that the upward trend is re-
stricted to the first five units. In the preceding chapter the suspect
nature of the cost data for these initial units was pointed out. Disre-
garding the plotted points for the first five units and determining the
regression line on the basis of cumulative average man-hours for
units 6 through 28
,
the least-squares method yields a learning curve
of 98.7%. The reasonableness of disregarding the individual cumula-
tive average man-hours for units 1 through 5 is believed apparent.
This does not mean that the man-hours for the first five units was
completely thrown out; the plottings for unit 6 through 28 include the
man-hours for the first five units since each of these points repre-
sents the average man-hour cost of all overhauls completed through
the unit indicated. Due to the minimum amount of negative slope in-
volved in the learning curve for the P2V-7S, 1.3%, it is not possible
to visually determine the reduction of man-hours from unit 1 to unit 2 .
As will be noted in Figure 9, the values for units 1 and 2 appear to be
the same. Using the method of lease-squares, unit 1 is calculated
as having a value of 5610 man-hours and unit 2 a value of 5540.
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the learning curve attributed
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to the P2V-7S was accepted as 98.7%.
C. INTERPRETATION OF THE CUMULATIVE AVERAGE
MAN-HOUR LEARNING CURVES
Anyone familiar with industrial effort has observed that progress
in the effective results of this effort frequently takes place as time
passes and the effort is continued. This progress is founded on a
multitude of causes whose individual effects vary from time to time.
Over a period of time the composite product of these causes is a pre-
dictable rate of improvement-the learning curve. The slope of a
given learning curve depends on the degree that each of the multitude
of causes is in evidence in a particular industrial effort.
In the preceding section the learning curves identified with




The different learning curves applicable means that in each of the
plane types the various causes that result in improvement were mani-
fest in differing degrees. This section undertakes the interpretation
of these differences . The interpretation of the three learning curves
will be done on a comparative basis therefore, the 90% curve of the
A4D-2 will be used as a point of reference.
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In analyzing a decrease in improvement between products of
an industrial facility there are certain major factors that must be
investigated. The first is a change in management policies and pro-
cedures that would create inefficiencies. This was not believed to
be a contributing factor as far as this study is concerned and will
be excluded from further consideration. The other two major factors
that affect a learning curve are (1) the extent of initial planning and
tooling, and (2) previous experience or know-how; these two factors
were used in analyzing the decrease in improvement of the A4D-2N
and the P2V-7S.
Initial planning and tooling can be either adequate or inade-
quate. In either case, the extent of the planning and tooling has a
decided effect on the slope of the learning curve. Careful planning
and efficient tooling tend to reduce the man-hours required to produce
the first unit. In other words, management has resolved problem
areas and incorporated efficient production techniques prior to the
commencement of production. The efficiencies accomplished at this
point mean that there will be less for the workmen to "learn" during
production. This reduction in the amount to be learned during produc-
tion is reflected by a shallower learning curve. Conversely, poor
preliminary planning leaves a considerable amount to be "learned"
during production and results in a steeper learning curve.
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Referring back to Figure 8, for the A4D-2N and Figure 9, for
the P2V-7S, it will be noted that there is no significant reduction in
the beginning units of either plane type consequently no apparent
evidence of poor planning. Rather, the beginning unit plots indicate
adequate planning.
The factor of previous experience is directly related to the
percentage that describes a learning curve, i.e. , as the amount of
previous experience increases the percentage of the learning curve
increases
.
There is little doubt about the carry over of experience from the
A4D-2 to the A4D-2N. These two aircraft are basically the same with
the exception of certain configurations that have modified the 2N into
a night attack aircraft. Further, the overhaul of the A4D-2 commenced
in January 1960 and that of the A4D-2N in January 1961. An example
of the effect of previous experience on a learning curve can be made
by using the data of the A4D-2N. As explained earlier, the learning
curve of the A4D-2N is 92%. If a new learning curve was developed
with unit 10 as the first unit and unit 11 as the second unit, etc. , then
this new learning curve would have a percentage value of approximate-
ly 97%. What happens here is that the new learning curve is not
credited with the learning that has taken place during the original
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curve consisting of nine units. In this case unit 10, unit 1 in the
new curve, is being compared to unit 11, unit 2 in the new curve,
as a doubling of quantity. From an actual production standpoint unit
10 should be compared with unit 20 and if so, the percentage of the
new curve would also be 92%, the same as the original curve.
In the example just cited both curves came from identical over-
hauls and this is not the case in the A4D-2 and the A4D-2N. Although
similar, there are differences and it is these differences that permit
a greater amount of learning than the 97% in the example. It is wor-
thy to note that the first unit of the A4D-2N took 1600 man-hours and
the unit of the A4D-2 that was completed at the same time took 139 7
man-hours. Theoretically this difference in man-hours can be attri-
buted to the new work involved in the night version of the basic air-
craft .
In summary then, the difference between the learning curves
of the A4D-2 and the A4D-2N can be attributed to previous experience
in a similar aircraft.
The same factor, previous experience, is ascribed to the rather
high, 98.7%, learning curve of the P2V-7S. This overhaul commenced
in January 1961 however, NAS Alameda had been overhauling the
P2V-7 since approximately July 1958. Differences in the two aircraft
are generally restricted to a sophistication of the anti-submarine
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warfare equipment in the 7S . During the period July 1958 and Janu-
ary 1961
, NAS Alameda overhauled approximately 83 of the P2V-7
aircraft. It is this extensive experience that accounts for the rather
high 98.7% learning curve.
No effort was made to arrive at an over-all average for the
three plane types. Since this was a limited study it was not believed
that any real significance could be attached to such an average. The
method of arriving at such an average would be the same as used by
the airframe industry in their learning curve work. All data would
have to be reduced to man-hours per pound of airframe. The defini-
tion of an airframe's weight is contained in the "Instructions for the
2Completion of Aeronautical Manufacturers Planning Reports".
2Approved September 1, 1950 and February 1, 1951, by the






A. REVIEW OF STUDY
This study was prompted by the outstanding success of learn-
ing curves in the airframe industry for the past fifteen years . The
value of these curves to the airframe industry is their unique ability
to forecast with reasonable accuracy:
1. Production costs for purposes of pricing,
2. Costs of major design changes,
3. Costs on which to base "make or buy" decisions, and
4. Labor and facility requirements for planning purposes.
The anecdote contained in the Preface points out this unique predictive
ability of the learning curve.
It is believed that this proven management tool can be success-
fully applied to Navy production and rework programs . Prior to apply-
ing a new technique, it is necessary to understand the process that
the technique employs . Chapter I explains the learning curve and its
basic theory that costs decline by some constant percentage as the
total quantity of units produced is doubled. A knowledge of the theory
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implies a knowledge of the relationship of each unit to every other
unit, e.g. , unit 21 would not be compared to unit 22 to prove the
learning curve, but rather unit 21 would be compared with unit 42—
a doubling of quantity.
In using data for the construction of a learning curve, tests of
chronology and comparability must be conducted. If data is not
plotted in the sequence of occurrence, the ability of the curve to re-
flect actual "learning" is distorted. The extent of the distortion
depends on the degree of disorder of the data. Improper sequence is
considerably easier to correct than is data that lacks comparability.
The only way to insure comparability of data is to make an exhaustive
investigation of the work being performed and the accounting system
that classifies the attributable costs. The purpose here is to make
certain that (1) significant changes in job content do not go unnoticed
and (2) that all assignable costs associated with the work are properly
collected. Continuing comparability dictates periodic checks of the
work being performed to detect job content changes and the recording
of costs
.
Knowledge of changes in job content means that collected data
must be adjusted in order to be usable as the basis of constructing
learning curves . The best method for insuring comparability where
job content changes are involved is to establish separate cost accounts
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for the changed work as soon as the change is effective. This is not
always possible therefore, the method for normalizing data will vary
depending on particular circumstances. Section C of Chapter III ex-
plains the method that was used to normalize the different weight
factors encountered in this study. There is no one way to accomplish
this rather difficult task, nor is any method used perfect in its solu-
tion.
Having obtained chronology and comparability of the data and
having plotted the data, the next task is the determination of the curve
that best describes the data. If the linearity of the plotted data is
near perfect then the curve can be fitted by visual inspection. How-
ever, if the resulting scatter diagram is difficult to interpret then the
method of least-squares should be used. This statistical method will
develop a regression line that is the best fit for the data plotted. The
methodology of this technique is explained in Section D of Chapter I.
The above procedures were applied to the data collected from
the NAS Alameda for the A4D-2
, A4D-2N, and the P2V-7S. The result-




Previous experience was determined as the cause of the reduced
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"learning" indicated by the increased curves of the A4D-2N and
the P2V-7S. The concept of previous experience, as related to learn-
ing curves, in a sense can be interpreted as viewing a given curve as
a continuation of a previous curve wherein the experience was gained.
Viewed in this light, a minimal learning curve incorporating previous
experience, such as the P2V-7S, cannot be dismissed as reflecting
an industrial effort practically devoid of learning and for which the
learning curve theory offers no management assistance. This thought
of dismissal would only be valid if there was never a change in the
products to be produced or overhauled. The only process that can be
thought of that has not changed over the ages, is the laying of bricks
and this perpetuation has only occurred as the result of an unusually
strong and long existent union. The rapid advances in technology
insure that the products involved in Navy production and overhaul
programs will be continually changing and therefore the amount of
carry-over of experience from one product to the next will vary depend-
ing on the extent of product change
.
B. CONCLUSIONS
It is reasonable to conclude that learning curves are applicable
to Navy aircraft overhauls. As protrayed by the P2V-7S, the theory
is even applicable to overhauls that include a high degree of previous
experience. This applicability indicates therefore that the static
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basis of overhaul cost determinations needs revision. Utilization
of engineered performance standards , in the form of weight factors
,
from period to period in preparing schedules, manpower requirements,
etc.
,
appears inefficient because it does not recognize the existence
of the "learning" phenomenon. This study proves the existence of
this phenomenon consequently effective management dictates that the
learning curve, that gives meaning to the phenomenon, be accepted
as a consideration in appropriate Navy decision making.
Acceptance of the learning curve as a factor in decision making
incorporates the same psychological pressure on workers that any per-
formance standards system includes . Once a control or quantitative
objective is imposed upon an organization, there are strong forces
created to make the performance fit the objective. In practice, a system
that uses static performance standards is defeating the natural "learn-
ing" phenomenon. The word natural is used because in any process
involving physical and mental effort of workers "learning" is bound to
occur. Learning curves recognize this "learning" and interpret it into
a meaningful form that can be used by management. Consequently, if
allowances for man-hours are obtained from linear extrapolations of
a learning curve, two forces are at work to reduce man-hour costs
(1) the natural "learning" indicated by the learning curve and (2) the
psychological pressure to make performance fit the allowances.
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Although this study was restricted to aircraft overhauls , it is
a reasonable assumption that the conclusion reached concerning the
learning curve's applicability to aircraft overhauls is also applicable
to other Navy production and overhaul or rework programs . A study
conducted of selected ship building during World War II revealed an
average decline of 16 to 22 per cent in the number of man-hours re-
quired in each doubling of output in representative yards building
Liberty ships, Victory ships, tankers, and standard cargo vessels.
Another writer holds that the learning curve is applicable regardless
of whether the industry is aircraft, metalworking, textile, or candy
2
making. These are but a few examples that fortify the idea that
learning curves can serve an enlightened management responsible




The purpose of this study was to determine if learning curves
are applicable to Navy aircraft overhaul programs with the ultimate
objective an improvement of management decisions in construction
Asher, op. cit.
, p. 5.
2 F. J. Andross, "The Learning Curve as a Production Tool,"




and overhaul programs by utilizing the unique predictive ability of
learning curves. Having established the applicability of learning
curves, it is now necessary to recommend actions that should be
taken in order to obtain the ultimate objective of improved manage-
ment decision making.
Realizing that this study is but a limited one, much effort will
have to be invested in analyzing empirical data in order to arrive at
conclusions as to specific learning curves applicable to each over-
haul activity and each series of aircraft.
RECOMMENDATION: That BuWeps initiate a program to develop the
family of learning curves for the various types of Naval aircraft and
overhaul activities; that BuWeps direct each overhaul activity to
determine, from empirical data, applicable learning curves for all
plane types undergoing overhaul.
In order to successfully utilize developed learning curves,
changes will have to be made to performance reporting and evaluat-
ing systems and scheduling methods.
RECOMMENDATION: That BuWeps conduct a study to define the
revisions that would be necessary in budgeting, scheduling, report-
ing and performance evaluation to incorporate the learning curve
theory in aircraft overhaul programs
.
To facilitate future analyses of cost data, it is most advisable
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to effect changes in the cost accounting system so as to obtain re-
fined data for use in learning curve computations.
RECOMMENDATION: That BuWeps modify the cost accounting system
at overhaul activities to the extent necessary to achieve chronology
and comparability of basic cost data.
There is no reason to believe that the advantages of the learn-
ing curve are restricted to BuWeps' aircraft overhaul program. Indi-
cations are that this advanced management technique has applic-
ability to any Navy production or overhaul program.
RECOMMENDATION: That all bureaus engaged in production or over-
haul programs , conduct studies to determine the applicability of
learning curves to the various programs and where applicability is
apparent take necessary steps to incorporate the learning curve theory
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The following table represents the data for the A4D-2N. In arriving
at the net man-hours, the sum of the service change and weight adjustment
man-hours are deducted from the gross man-hours. All units were normal-
ized on the basis of a 1.8 weight factor. Chapter III, Section C, contains
an explanation of the method used to normalize the weight factor.
TABLE 5
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE MAN-HOUR DATA FOR A4D-2N
DATE BUREAU WGT.
UNIT COMPLETE NUMBER FACTOR
GROSS SERVICE WGT. NET CUMULATIVE
M/H CH.M/H ADJ. M/H AVE. M/H
1 2-21-61 145062 1.8 1873 273 000 1600 1600
2 3-07-61 145064 2.3 2244 312 370 1562 1581
3 3-31-61 145066 2.3 2533 601 370 1562 1574
4 4-27-61 145068 1.8 1572 45 3 000 1119 1460
5 6-07-61 145084 1.8 1693 174 000 1519 1471
6 6-13-61 145077 1.8 1638 196 000 1442 1465
7 6-13-61 145096 1.8 1688 601 000 1087 1411
8 6-20-61 145100 1.8 1653 134 000 1519 1424
9 6-26-61 145085 1.8 1839 415 000 1424 1424
10 6-20-61 145103 1.8 1688 422 000 1266 1408
11 6-26-61 145109 1.8 1764 823 000 941 1365
12 6-26-61 145088 1.8 1820 422 000 1398 1367
13 6-28-61 145090 1.8 1896 439 000 1457 1373
14 6-30-61 145111 1.8 1983 781 000 1202 1360
15 7-11-61 145091 2.6 2172 416 592 1164 1346
16 7-18-61 145094 2.7 2030 342 666 1022 1325
17 7-25-61 145101 2.5 2050 357 518 1175 1316
18 7-27-61 145092 2.6 2224 412 592 1220 1310
19 7-27-61 145065 2.4 2244 357 444 1443 1317
20 8-18-61 145093 2.6 1965 251 592 1122 1307
21 8-24-61 145118 2.5 2077 195 518 1364 1309
22 8-28-61 145127 2.4 2042 216 444 1382 1312
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DATE BUREAU WGT. GROSS SERVICE WGT. NET CUMULATIVE
UNIT COMPLETE NUMBER FACTOR M/H CH.M/HADJ. M/H AVE.M/H
23 8-31-61 145108 2.5 1841 184 518 1139 1304
24 9-06-61 145095 2.5 1952 198 518 1236 1301
25 9-12-61 145110 2.5 1892 208 518 1166 1295
26 9-14-61 145119 2.5 1773 186 518 1061 1286
27 9-15-61 145115 2.5 1794 226 518 1050 1277
28 9-22-61 145125 2.6 1866 185 592 1089 1270
29 9-28-61 145074 2.6 2058 78 592 1388 1274
30 9-28-61 147669 2.5 1787 205 518 1064 1267
31 10-05-61 147715 2.5 1897 193 518 1186 1264
32 10-05-61 147671 2.5 1820 261 518 1041 1257
33 10-10-61 147673 2.5 1794 233 518 1043 1250
34 10-12-61 145102 2.5 1720 465 518 737 1235
35 10-15-61 147674 2.5 1976 316 518 1142 1232
36 10-21-61 147701 2.5 1839 222 518 1099 1228
37 11-03-61 145123 2.5 2216 284 518 1414 1233
38 11-06-61 147711 2.5 2378 608 518 1252 1233
39 11-06-61 147713 2.5 1926 254 518 1154 1230
40 11-18-61 147749 2.5 1833 236 518 1079 1226
41 11-27-61 147783 2.5 1625 40 518 1067 1222
42 12-04-61 147752 2.5 1780 251 518 1011 1217
43 12-07-61 147788 2.5 1775 40 518 1217 1217
44 12-08-61 147794 2.5 1736 45 518 1173 1216
45 12-11-61 147802 2.5 1457 45 518 894 1209
46 12-12-61 147727 2.5 1714 229 518 967 1204
47 12-12-61 147759 2.5 1788 218 518 1052 1200
48 12-26-61 147755 2.5 1732 236 518 978 1196
49 12-26-61 147816 2.2 1647 60 296 1291 1197
50 12-27-61 147793 2.5 1615 60 518 1037 1194
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